TABLE IV-9. (Continued)

Group	Number of Beneficiaries	Benefits: Current Law	Generic I	Modified I	Modified II	Modified III	Generic IV
Other Divorced Women							
Total	2,930	6,190	6,920	7,230	7,210	7,300	6,960
Worked at least 30 yrs.	2,230	6,630	7,340	7,660	7,650	7,710	7,380
Worked fewer than 30 yrs.	710	4,810	5,600	5,880	5,810	6,040	5,630
Widowers							
Total	3,810	9,680	10,140	10,160	10,130	10,160	10,200
Divorced Men							
Total	4,360	9,550	8,960	9,000	8,980	9,070	9,690
Percentage Change in Total Benefits in 2030 Paid to Elderly Recipients Relative to Current Law c/							
Total	--	--	1.0	2.6	-1.5	2.0	4.1

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office simulations.

a. See the text for a description of the plans. Beneficiaries depicted in this table are age 62 or older and would account for approximately three-quarters of all beneficiaries in the simulated population.

b. Couples in which both spouses would receive benefits under current law and at least one spouse is age 62 or older.

c. These estimates include elderly groups not shown in the table--about 5.4 million couples in which only one spouse would be receiving benefits and 6.7 million never-married individuals.

The estimates reported in this chapter also highlight several problems and issues. In particular, elderly women who had been outside the paid labor force for many years would, in general, incur losses: married couples in which the wife had worked less than 30 years and widows who had worked less than 30 years generally would be worse off on average under earnings sharing than under current policy. They could be protected by guaranteeing them some or all of their current law benefits, but this would raise the total cost of earnings sharing and prevent equalization of benefits for one- and two-earner couples, and their survivors, with the same total earnings.

In addition, the transition provisions accompanying an earnings sharing plan can play an important role in the plan's effects--even 40 years after implementation. A rapid transition to a new benefit structure based entirely on earnings sharing, such as would occur with Transition II, would result in many beneficiaries incurring losses because of being caught in the middle of the change in benefit rules. A slow transition would raise total costs. The provisions suggested by the Technical Committee (Transition III) illustrate how transition rules could be structured in a way that would provide greater protection for low-benefit recipients than for high-benefit recipients, but would do so by altering the existing redistributive balance in the program.

A key issue in the development and assessment of earnings sharing plans is the extent to which the gains to some beneficiaries should be paid for by others through reductions in their benefits (relative to current law). One way or another, higher benefits for some recipients must be paid for--either through lower benefits for others or through higher taxes.

CHAPTER V

INCREMENTAL OPTIONS

Earnings sharing is not the only way in which Social Security might be modified to address the concerns discussed in Chapter II; a number of other, less far-reaching, methods could be used. The HHS report analyzed a variety of these measures, including some that would increase benefits for working spouses, surviving spouses, and divorced spouses. These approaches would generally build on features that already exist under current law, and could affect benefits for those retiring in the relatively near term. They could be used either to complement earnings-sharing proposals that would not be effective for many years, or as substitutes.

HHS examined 24 incremental options designed to mitigate problems with the current benefit structure, evaluating each independently of the others. CBO has no fundamental disagreement with the HHS analyses of these options. 1/ Because the Congress may want to consider implementing more than one of the options, CBO has examined combinations of them. For example, these combinations include options that would address the disparities in benefits received by the survivors of one- and two-earner couples, and others that could be used to improve the adequacy of benefits for elderly divorced spouses. The combinations of incremental options presented below are meant to illustrate possible approaches, and should not be construed as recommendations.

It should be noted that modifications in the benefit structure might have unintended effects. For example, increasing divorced spouses' benefits might encourage some couples to divorce. Similarly, incremental changes designed to assist low-income beneficiaries might increase the income of relatively affluent recipients as well, and might also entail significant costs. In fact, if the aim is to increase the incomes of the poorest recipients of Social Security, altering the benefit structure may be less efficient than focusing on means-tested programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), to achieve the same goals at lower cost. But the pros and cons of doing so are beyond the scope of this report.

---

1. The Congress might wish to modify some of them. For example, the zero earnings requirement for child care dropout years would cause a notch to result between the benefits received by different groups of women because women with very low earnings might receive lower benefits than otherwise similar persons with no earnings in a given year.

DESCRIPTION OF THE OPTIONS

CBO has selected three specific options from the HHS report for analysis. Two options deal with the issue of disparate benefits for the survivors of one- and two-earner couples who had the same combined earnings. The other option would provide higher benefits for divorced spouses. For purposes of comparison, CBO has analyzed a second option for divorced spouses as well. Each of these options would guarantee current law benefits to recipients, thereby ensuring that no one would lose from the changes.

The alternatives are presented in four different combinations, with each of the survivor options being packaged with a divorced spouse option. They are analyzed in terms of their impacts on benefit levels in 2030, to make them comparable with the analyses already presented. Unlike earnings sharing, these changes could be implemented relatively quickly, so that their effects would be greater in earlier years. The options for survivors are as follows:

- Survivors would inherit all of the earnings credits of their deceased spouses for the years during which they were married, including those prior to enactment of this option. These credits would be combined with the survivors' earnings credits, subject to the limitation that the total in any year could not exceed the taxable maximum wage. A beneficiary's earnings record for years in which he or she was not married would not be altered.

- Alternatively, survivors' benefits would equal two-thirds of the sum of their own retirement or disability benefits and the benefits for which they would be eligible as surviving spouses.

The options for divorced spouses are as follows:

- Divorced spouses' benefits would be raised by one percentage point for each year of marriage over 10 and up to 35 years. Therefore, benefits would equal 50 percent of the former spouses' PIAs for marriages lasting 10 years and rise to 75 percent for marriages ending in divorce that lasted at least 35 years. The current law requirement for duration of marriage--10 years--would remain unchanged, and the higher divorced spouses' benefits would not be available until two years after the final divorce decree. Actuarial reductions would be computed in the same manner as now.

- o Divorced spouses' benefits would be increased from 50 percent to 75 percent of the former spouses' PIAs, but these higher benefits would be payable beginning two years after the final divorce decree. This option was not included in the HHS report.

Thus the four packages or combinations of options are:

- o Package A: Inheritance of earnings credits and increased divorced spouses' benefits depending on the length of marriage (options 1 and 3);
- o Package B: Survivors' benefits equal to two-thirds of the combined worker/survivor benefits and increased divorced spouses' benefits depending on the length of marriage (options 2 and 3);
- o Package C: Inheritance of earnings credits and a 75-percent-of-PIA divorced spouses' benefit (options 1 and 4); and
- o Package D: Survivors' benefits equal to two-thirds of the combined worker/survivor benefits and a 75-percent-of-PIA divorced spouses' benefit (options 2 and 4).

COMPARISON OF PACKAGES OF INCREMENTAL OPTIONS

The incremental options, as indicated earlier, may be considered either as alternatives or as complements to earnings sharing proposals. In this section, the relative costs of the four packages and their effects on beneficiaries are discussed and compared with the earnings sharing options. The simulated benefits for the four packages are also compared to one another for their potential effects on elderly widowed and divorced populations. Finally, issues relating to the use of these packages or other incremental options as part of the transition to a fully implemented earnings sharing system are discussed.

Total Increases in Benefits Under the Packages of Incremental Options

Total benefit payments in 2030 from an incremental package would be 3.6 percent to 4.2 percent higher than under current law (see Table V-1), an increase (in 1984 dollars) of $23 billion to $27 billion in 2030 Social Security benefit payments. (These costs are somewhat different from those produced by the Office of the Actuary. See Appendix A for a discussion of these

57-006 O - 86 - 3

differences and of the potential near-term budget costs.) The highest cost would be that for Package C--the combination of inheritance of earnings credits and the flat 75 percent divorced spouses' benefit--while the smallest increase in benefits would be under Package B--two-thirds of the combined worker/survivor benefit plus the divorced spouses' benefit scaled to years of marriage.

Overall, the costs of the incremental packages are similar to those of the Modified Earnings Sharing plans with the first and third transition options. The incremental plans have virtually all of their impact on elderly beneficiaries, however, whereas the earnings sharing plans would provide substantial increases to many nonelderly as well. For example, Package D--two-thirds of the combined worker/survivor benefit and the 75 percent divorced spouses' benefit--would increase 2030 total benefit payments by the same percentage as the Modified III plan, but the average increase for the elderly would be 4.4 percent under Package D and about 2.0 percent under the earnings sharing plan.

By far the largest component of the costs is attributable to the options dealing with survivors (1 and 2) rather than to those for divorced spouses (3 and 4). If inheritance of earnings credits (Option 1) or two-thirds of the

TABLE V-1. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TOTAL OASDI BENEFIT PAYMENTS IN 2030 UNDER FOUR PACKAGES OF INCREMENTAL OPTIONS

	Under Age 62	Age 62 or Older	All Ages
Package A	0.7	4.2	3.9
Package B	0.0	4.0	3.6
Package C	0.7	4.5	4.2
Package D	0.0	4.4	4.0

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.

combined benefits (Option 2) were implemented alone, the increased benefit costs would amount to 3.6 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively. By comparison, the divorced spouse options are much less expensive--0.3 percent for Option 3, and 0.7 percent for Option 4--although Option 4 is more than twice as expensive as Option 3.

Comparison of the Packages with Earnings Sharing Plans

The packages of incremental options detailed here would chiefly affect widowed and divorced persons. They would also have a small effect on married couples, but only the results for widows, widowers, and divorced men and women are presented here.

Tables V-2 through V-6 display the simulation results. The packages would provide higher benefits on average to widows, widowers, divorced women with at least one deceased spouse, and divorced men than would be provided under current law or under any of the earnings sharing plans. Divorced women whose former husband(s) still survived would receive, on average, more from Packages A and B than under current law, but less than they would receive under the earnings sharing proposals. Packages C and D, which would provide a 75 percent divorced spouses' benefit to all those meeting the duration of marriage requirement, would increase benefits more than some earnings sharing plans but less than the most generous ones.

Because the packages incorporate present law benefit guarantees, no beneficiary would experience benefit reductions relative to current law--which necessarily would increase program costs. Because virtually all of the additional benefits would be targeted on widows and divorced persons, the packages would permit much larger increases among the target groups than would the earnings sharing proposals. For example, average benefits for widows under Package A would be 8.1 percent higher than under the Generic I earnings sharing plan and 8.5 percent above current law levels (see Table V-2). In addition, approximately twice as many of these widows would gain more than 5 percent relative to current law under Packages A and C than under Generic I. Under Packages B and D, the ratio would be almost 3 to 1.

Divorced women with deceased former spouses are simulated to receive, on average, about 10 percent higher benefits under Packages A and B than under current law. In contrast, average increases for this elderly group under the earnings sharing plans would range from 2.0 percent under the Modified III plan to 5.5 percent under the Generic IV plan (see Table V-3).

TABLE V-2. ANNUAL BENEFITS OF WIDOWS IN THE YEAR 2030 UNDER EARNINGS SHARING AND UNDER FOUR PACKAGES OF INCREMENTAL OPTIONS (Numbers of beneficiaries in thousands, benefits in 1984 dollars) a/

Option	Average Benefit Under Plan	Percent Change c/	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/ Number	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/ Average Gain	Beneficiaries Who Would Lose At Least 5 % b/ Number	Beneficiaries Who Would Lose At Least 5 % b/ Average Loss
Earnings Sharing Alternatives						
Generic I	9,230	0.4	2,930	1,730	1,680	2,720
Modified I	9,270	0.8	3,220	1,710	1,650	2,700
Modified III	8,990	-2.2	3,250	1,710	5,300	1,500
Generic IV	9,540	3.7	2,930	1,730	--	--
Incremental Packages						
Package A	9,980	8.5	6,150	1,900	--	--
Package B	10,010	8.9	8,410	1,440	--	--
Package C	9,980	8.6	6,200	1,910	--	--
Package D	10,020	8.9	8,430	1,450	--	--

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office simulations.

a. See the text for a description of the plans. The 15.32 million beneficiaries depicted in this table are age 62 or older.

b. Beneficiaries are considered to have gained or lost if their benefits under the plan would be at least 5 percent higher or lower than their benefits under current law in the simulation year.

c. Relative to benefit under current law.

TABLE V-3. ANNUAL BENEFITS OF DIVORCED WOMEN WITH DECEASED EX-HUSBANDS IN THE YEAR 2030 UNDER EARNINGS SHARING AND UNDER FOUR PACKAGES OF INCREMENTAL OPTIONS (Numbers of beneficiaries in thousands, benefits in 1984 dollars) a/

Option	Average Benefit Under Plan	Percent Change c/	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/		Beneficiaries Who Would Lose At Least 5 % b/	
			Number	Average Gain	Number	Average Loss
Earnings Sharing Alternatives						
Generic I	8,490	3.0	1,990	1,420	510	2,610
Modified I	8,600	4.4	2,380	1,490	510	2,530
Modified III	8,400	2.0	2,500	1,510	1,720	1,490
Generic IV	8,700	5.5	1,990	1,420	--	--
Incremental Packages						
Package A	9,100	10.4	3,280	1,640	--	--
Package B	9,070	10.1	3,300	1,580	--	--
Package C	9,200	11.6	3,410	1,770	--	--
Package D	9,200	11.6	3,540	1,700	--	--

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office simulations.

a. See the text for a description of the plans. The 15.32 million beneficiaries depicted in this table are age 62 or older.

b. Beneficiaries are considered to have gained or lost if their benefits under the plan would be at least 5 percent higher or lower than their benefits under current law in the simulation year.

c. Relative to benefit under current law.

TABLE V-4. ANNUAL BENEFITS OF DIVORCED WOMEN WITHOUT DECEASED EX-HUSBANDS IN THE YEAR 2030 UNDER EARNINGS SHARING AND UNDER FOUR PACKAGES OF INCREMENTAL OPTIONS (Numbers of beneficiaries in thousands, benefits in 1984 dollars) a/

Option	Average Benefit Under Plan	Percent Change c/	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/ Number	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/ Average Gain	Beneficiaries Who Would Lose At Least 5 % b/ Number	Beneficiaries Who Would Lose At Least 5 % b/ Average Loss
Earnings Sharing Alternatives						
Generic I	6,920	11.8	1,760	1,240	120	660
Modified I	7,230	16.7	2,160	1,420	90	650
Modified III	7,300	17.9	2,260	1,450	70	690
Generic IV	6,960	12.4	1,760	1,240	--	--
Incremental Packages						
Package A	6,700	8.2	1,020	1,440	--	--
Package B	6,700	8.2	1,020	1,440	--	--
Package C	7,170	15.8	1,420	2,010	--	--
Package D	7,170	15.8	1,420	2,010	--	--

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office simulations.

a. See the text for a description of the plans. The 15.32 million beneficiaries depicted in this table are age 62 or older.

b. Beneficiaries are considered to have gained or lost if their benefits under the plan would be at least 5 percent higher or lower than their benefits under current law in the simulation year.

c. Relative to benefit under current law.

TABLE V-5. ANNUAL BENEFITS OF WIDOWERS IN THE YEAR 2030 UNDER EARNINGS SHARING AND UNDER FOUR PACKAGES OF INCREMENTAL OPTIONS (Numbers of beneficiaries in thousands, benefits in 1984 dollars) a/

Option	Average Benefit Under Plan	Percent Change c/	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/		Beneficiaries Who Would Lose At Least 5 % b/	
			Number	Average Gain	Number	Average Loss
Earnings Sharing Alternatives						
Generic I	10,140	4.8	1,430	1,180	130	1,590
Modified I	10,160	4.9	1,430	1,190	130	1,450
Modified III	10,160	4.9	1,430	1,190	130	1,250
Generic IV	10,200	5.4	1,430	1,180	--	--
Incremental Packages						
Package A	10,450	7.9	2,060	1,270	--	--
Package B	10,330	6.7	1,660	1,440	--	--
Package C	10,450	7.9	2,060	1,270	--	--
Package D	10,330	6.7	1,660	1,440	--	--

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office simulations.

a. See the text for a description of the plans. The 15.32 million beneficiaries depicted in this table are age 62 or older.

b. Beneficiaries are considered to have gained or lost if their benefits under the plan would be at least 5 percent higher or lower than their benefits under current law in the simulation year.

c. Relative to benefit under current law.

TABLE V-6. ANNUAL BENEFITS OF DIVORCED MEN IN THE YEAR 2030 UNDER EARNINGS SHARING AND UNDER FOUR PACKAGES OF INCREMENTAL OPTIONS (Numbers of beneficiaries in thousands, benefits in 1984 dollars) a/ b/

Option	Average Benefit Under Plan	Percent Change d/	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % c/ Number	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % c/ Average Gain	Beneficiaries Who Would Lose At Least 5 % c/ Number	Beneficiaries Who Would Lose At Least 5 % c/ Average Loss
Earnings Sharing Alternatives						
Generic I	8,960	-6.3	490	1,000	2,280	1,340
Modified I	9,000	-5.8	590	990	2,160	1,360
Modified III	9,070	-5.1	590	990	2,060	1,270
Generic IV	9,690	1.4	490	1,000	--	--
Incremental Packages						
Package A	9,810	2.7	810	1,150	--	--
Package B	9,760	2.1	590	1,450	--	--
Package C	9,820	2.8	840	1,180	--	--
Package D	9,770	2.3	630	1,470	--	--

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office simulations.

a. See the text for a description of the plans. The 15.32 million beneficiaries depicted in this table are age 62 or older.

b. The relatively small unweighted number of divorced men precludes the separate treatment of those with and without a deceased former spouse.

c. Beneficiaries are considered to have gained or lost if their benefits under the plan would be at least 5 percent higher or lower than their benefits under current law in the simulation year.

d. Relative to benefit under current law.

Compared with the various earnings sharing plans, the inheritance of earnings histories combined with the increase in divorced spouses' benefits linked to the length of the marriage (Package A) would have about two-thirds more gainers than the Generic I and Generic IV plans, and about 30 to 40 percent more than the Modified I and III plans. Setting all divorced spouses' benefits equal to 75 percent of their former spouses' PIAs would result in slightly larger increases on average for divorced women with deceased ex-spouses--Packages C and D both would increase benefits 11.6 percent--because a slightly higher percentage would gain than under Packages A and B. The benefits of some women with deceased ex-husbands would be affected by the rules governing divorced spouses because they also have living ex-husbands.

The simulation results indicate that widowers would also fare better under either package than under earnings sharing. On average, Packages A and B would raise their benefits by 7.9 and 6.7 percent respectively, whereas the average gain under the four earnings sharing plans displayed in Table V-5 would be 4.8 to 5.4 percent. Moreover, the proportion of widowers gaining at least 5 percent relative to current law would be about 54 percent under Package A, 44 percent under Package B, and about 38 percent under the earnings sharing plans. More widowers gain under these incremental options because they can benefit from earnings before 1990 and because none of them lose by sharing earnings with a living former spouse. Packages C and D containing the flat 75 percent divorced spouses' benefit would have no greater effect on widowers than would Packages A and B.

Divorced men would, on average, receive small increases in benefits under all four packages of incremental changes, in contrast to the average reductions they would experience under three of the four earnings sharing alternatives shown in Table V-6. The combination of the inheritance of credits and either of the two divorced spouses' benefit options (Packages A and C) would result in about 19 percent of divorced men receiving increases of 5 percent or more. On the other hand, Packages B and D and the earnings sharing plans would have somewhat smaller percentages of gainers, ranging from 11 percent to 14 percent.

Under Packages A and B, the only elderly group that would fare less well than under earnings sharing would be divorced women whose ex-spouses were still alive (see Table V-4). In contrast to the earnings sharing proposals, which would raise their benefits by roughly 12 percent to 18 percent, Packages A and B would increase average benefits by about 8 percent. Moreover, the earnings sharing proposals would have 70 percent to 120 percent more gainers than would these two incremental combinations. The more favorable treatment of divorced women under earnings sharing would result from the fact that they would benefit from the sharing of earnings while their ex-spouses survived. Moreover, when the divorced spouses' benefit is related to years of marriage, many divorced women would get little or no additional benefits either because they had been married not much longer than 10 years, or because their worker benefits would exceed their potential divorced spouse benefits. Making the divorced spouses' benefit a flat 75 percent would provide about 40 percent more gainers than under the alternative divorced spouses' benefit option, and the gainers would receive 40 percent larger increases as well.

Comparison of the Packages with Each Other

Differences between the individual packages stem from their different treatment of survivors and of divorced persons. Widows, widowers, and divorced persons who survived their ex-spouses would be principally affected by whether the specific package allowed inheritance of credits or provided two-thirds of the combined benefits. On the other hand, elderly divorced recipients whose former spouses were still alive could only receive additional benefits as a result of the more generous divorced spouses' benefit.

Tables V-7 through V-10 present the simulated distributional effects of the various incremental packages for subgroups of the beneficiary population. For widows, packages containing the inheritance of earnings credits--Packages A and C--would tend to benefit fewer recipients but would provide larger average increases to those receiving increases than would the approach based on two-thirds of the combined benefits. Any woman whose benefit as a survivor is less than twice as large as her benefit as a worker would gain from the combined-benefit options. Whether she would gain from the options that include inheritance of earnings credits would depend on the length of her marriage, the correspondence of her working years with those of her husband, and on the relative sizes of the actuarial reductions in her worker benefits and in her survivor benefits.

Each of the packages would provide much larger percentage increases to low-benefit widows than to high-benefit widows. Widows with current law benefits below $7,500 would receive increases averaging from 14.2 percent under Package B to 16.3 percent under Package C; those with benefits exceeding $12,500 would receive increases ranging from 1.8 percent to 2.8 percent. Packages A and C, which include the inheritance of earnings credits, would help low-benefit widows for two reasons. First, low-benefit widows are likely to have husbands with low earnings. The progressivity of the benefit formula means that adding a wife's earnings to her husband's has a larger effect if his earnings are low. Second, low-benefit widows tend to have larger actuarial reductions than high-benefit women. Women who receive survivor benefits with large reductions are more likely to gain from a worker benefit based on combined earnings. Packages B and D would benefit more low-benefit widows than high-benefit widows because a woman is more likely to have worker benefits more than half as big as her survivor benefit if her survivor benefit is small.

The results for divorced women with deceased ex-husbands show similar patterns of gains relative to current law benefit levels, but the inheritance of earnings credits would be slightly more favorable to them than providing two-thirds of the combined worker/survivor benefits. Moreover, the largest differences would be for the lowest benefit group, with the two packages containing the inheritance option--Packages A and C--increasing average benefits by 18.3 percent and 21.4 percent respectively, while the corresponding increases for Packages B and D would be 12.9 percent and 16.8 percent. Packages A and C are more attractive for divorced women because the inheritance option benefits divorced women who were married as few as three years but divorced women must have been married at least ten years to qualify for a survivor benefit. Divorced women who are ineligible for survivor benefits would be concentrated in the low-benefit category.

In addition, the lowest benefit groups would experience the largest relative benefit increase from the flat 75 percent divorced spouses' benefit as incorporated into Packages C and D. Women who were married to their deceased ex-spouses less than 10 years and women whose ex-husbands had low earnings will tend to have low benefits. If such women also have living ex-husbands, they may benefit from an increase in the spouses' benefit level, especially if the increase does not depend on the length of marriage.

Widowers would tend to be affected somewhat differently than widows under the incremental packages. Average gains for all widowers would be higher under Packages A and C--those containing the inheritance of earnings credits--than under Packages B and D, and inheritance would provide gains of over 5 percent to about 24 percent more of these recipients than would the combined-benefits approach. On the other hand, the average gain for those with increases would be about 13 percent higher with the combined-worker/survivor-benefits option.

The inheritance option provides more additional benefits than the combined-benefit option for widowers, while widows do better under the combined-benefit option. This inheritance option is relatively more attractive to men than to women because very few widowers receive survivor benefits, with their favorable treatment of actuarial adjustments, under

TABLE V-7. ANNUAL BENEFITS OF SELECTED ELDERLY GROUPS IN THE YEAR 2030 UNDER PACKAGE A (Numbers of beneficiaries in thousands; benefits in 1984 dollars) a/

Benefits Under Current Law	Number of Beneficiaries	Average Benefit Under Plan	Percent Change c/	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/	
				Number	Average Gain
Widows					
Total	15,320	9,980	8.5	6,150	1,900
Below $7,500	4,730	6,680	16.1	2,640	1,640
$ 7,500 - $10,000	4,790	9,760	11.2	2,210	2,070
$10,000 - $12,500	3,630	11,790	5.9	1,050	2,180
$12,500 and Over	2,160	14,620	1.8	250	2,030
Divorced Women with Deceased Ex-Spouses					
Total	6,400	9,100	10.4	3,280	1,640
Below $7,500	2,850	6,740	18.3	2,020	1,450
$ 7,500 - $10,000	1,950	9,560	10.1	910	1,840
$10,000 - $12,500	1,030	11,710	5.7	290	2,160
$12,500 and Over	570	14,600	2.1	60	2,540
Other Divorced Women					
Total	2,930	6,700	8.2	1,020	1,440
Below $7,500	2,310	5,960	10.8	920	1,440
$7,500 and Over	620	9,440	2.4	100	1,380

(Continued)

TABLE V-7. (Continued)

Benefits Under Current Law	Number of Beneficiaries	Average Benefit Under Plan	Percent Change c/	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/ Number	Average Gain
Widowers					
Total	3,810	10,450	7.9	2,060	1,270
Below $7,500	1,010	6,590	14.3	670	1,190
$ 7,500 - $10,000	1,180	9,600	10.4	760	1,330
$10,000 - $12,500	850	11,780	6.1	370	1,310
$12,500 and Over	760	15,340	3.9	250	1,210
Divorced Men					
Total	4,360	9,810	2.7	810	1,150
Below $7,500	1,200	6,030	5.4	380	910
$ 7,500 - $10,000	1,380	9,010	3.1	270	1,160
$10,000 - $12,500	920	11,320	1.7	90	1,490
$12,500 and Over	860	14,760	1.4	60	2,140

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office simulations.

a. See the text for a description of the plans. Beneficiaries depicted in this table are age 62 or older.

b. Beneficiaries are considered to have gained or lost if their benefits under the plan would be at least 5 percent higher or lower than their benefits under current law in the simulation year.

c. Relative to benefit under current law.

TABLE V-8. ANNUAL BENEFITS OF SELECTED ELDERLY GROUPS IN THE YEAR 2030 UNDER PACKAGE B (Numbers of beneficiaries in thousands; benefits in 1984 dollars) a/

Benefits Under Current Law	Number of Beneficiaries	Average Benefit Under Plan	Percent Change c/	Beneficiaries Who Would Gain At Least 5 % b/	
				Number	Average Gain
Widows					
Total	15,320	10,010	8.9	8,410	1,440
Below $7,500	4,730	6,570	14.2	3,100	1,230
$ 7,500 - $10,000	4,790	9,740	11.0	2,910	1,550
$10,000 - $12,500	3,630	12,010	7.8	1,840	1,660
$12,500 and Over	2,160	14,760	2.8	550	1,400
Divorced Women with Deceased Ex-Spouses					
Total	6,400	9,070	10.1	3,300	1,580
Below $7,500	2,850	6,430	12.9	1,450	1,430
$ 7,500 - $10,000	1,950	9,730	12.0	1,210	1,640
$10,000 - $12,500	1,030	11,980	8.2	490	1,850
$12,500 and Over	570	14,760	3.2	150	1,600
Other Divorced Women					
Total	2,930	6,700	8.2	1,020	1,440
Below $7,500	2,310	5,960	10.8	920	1,440
$7,500 and Over	620	9,440	2.4	100	1,380

(Continued)